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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this presentation is to develop a framework that enables us to discern the 
political economy determinants of FDI openness in emerging economies that received 
large flows of FDI during the past 15 years.  Even tough the political economy field is 
recently thriving with contributions that help us understand the multidisciplinary aspects 
of foreign investment, our comprehension level is still behind that of international trade.  
This opens up the door for exciting research opportunities but it also constitutes a 
tremendous challenge. While the current literature has focused on the “ex-ante” political 
and economic conditions that can propel FDI openness, it has not considered the extent 
to which foreign investment, through its impact on the relative price of the domestic 
factors of production and on the market structure, can stimulate changes in the design of 
FDI policies.  In addition, specific features of emerging economies have not been 
sufficiently explored in their relationship with FDI.  This study seeks to fill in these 
gaps by using the specific cases of Argentina and Brazil. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Argentinean and Brazilian economies are among those that suffered the great loss 
of a decade of economic growth and potential economic and social prosperity during the 
1980s. While recovering from the trauma, these economies turned to democracy and the 
market as the knight in shining armor that could bring back the time lost in the 1980s. 
The rules of transition to democracy and the rules of the market propelled these 
economies into an adventure of reform that impregnated every aspect of the economic, 
social and political life. 
 
The economic-policy changes and the revolution in the role assigned to the State were 
encouraged by sharp economic crises, deep ideological changes, and the pressure 
exerted by multilateral organizations.  Foreign direct investment (FDI) was one of the 
Washington-Consensus prescribed antibiotics that would bring economic growth 
through technological, managerial, and know-how spillovers and through stable 
financing of external disequilibria. A mix of blind belief on the medicine prescribed and 
the need for stable financing encouraged many Latin American countries to embrace a 
set of reforms that would open up even their most strategic sectors to capital inflows 
from the rest of the world.   
 
More than a decade after the liberalization of FDI, both the Argentinean and Brazilian 
governments still welcome foreign investors.  However, there are incipient signals that 
attitudes towards opening might be changing.  There has recently been a gradual 
increase in the number of investor-State disputes (UNCTAD, 2007). Echoes of 
restrictive-FDI measures adopted by Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela reverberate across 
the region.  Moreover, Argentinean policy-makers have subtly introduced since 2003 
slight changes to their foreign capital regime.  Meanwhile, Argentine citizenry, maybe 
encouraged by a strong nationalistic political discourse, frequently use the imagery of 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) as the representation of past and current economic 
policy failures.  
 
The purpose of this presentation is to develop a framework that enables us to discern the 
political economy determinants of FDI openness in emerging economies that received 
large flows of FDI during the past 15 years.  Even tough the political economy field is 
recently thriving with contributions that help us understand the multidisciplinary aspects 
of foreign investment, our comprehension level is still behind that of international trade.  
This opens up the door for exciting research opportunities but it also constitutes a 
tremendous challenge.  The openness process has received scant attention perhaps due 
to the still relatively unexplored terrain of the distributional implications of FDI, 
considered by scholars as a research frontier (Frieden and Martin, 2002 and Kobrin, 
2005). 
 
Given the difficulties in evaluating FDI policies and the wide variety in national policy 
frameworks, it is still relatively soon to provide a systematic analysis on FDI policies in 
the aftermath of the Washington Consensus.  However, discerning the determinants 
could help us predict whether changes to the relative degree of openness are likely in 
the near future and could improve our understanding of the relationship between foreign 
investment, the host state and domestic factors of production.  Moreover, the reasons 
behind openness to FDI influence the regulations inherent to the liberalization regime 
and their implementation. 
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This paper contributes to the current literature by proposing the need for a dynamic 
analytical framework specific for emerging economies that liberalized their FDI regimes 
during the Washington Consensus era.  While the current literature has focused on the 
“ex-ante” political and economic conditions that can propel FDI openness, it has not 
considered the extent to which foreign investment, through its impact on the relative 
price of the domestic factors of production and on the market structure, can stimulate 
changes in the design of FDI policies.  In addition, specific features of emerging 
economies — such as their vulnerability to current account and exchange rate crisis, the 
presence of business groups (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007), a sharp barrier in the labor 
force between skilled and unskilled workers, and their relation with the international 
organizations — have not been sufficiently explored in their relationship with FDI.  
Emerging markets tend to have a sort of love-hate relationship with MNCs that has been 
widely acknowledge by the literature. Issues of national sovereignty and cultural 
identity, ownership of natural resources and property rights have encouraged tension 
between foreign investment and local attitudes.  At the same time, many emerging 
markets compete fiercely through incentives to attract foreign multinationals. 
 
This presentation is structured as follows. First I briefly introduce the stylized facts of 
FDI flows to both Argentina and Brazil within the wider context of the Latin American 
region. The purpose is to show the magnitude of the flows as well as the relevance for 
the recipient economies.  Secondly, I review the political economy benefits and costs of 
opening up the economy to FDI. The results obtained enable the introduction, in the 
third section, of a dynamic political economy framework that considers both the “ex-
ante” and the “ex-post” liberalization scenarios. The fourth section presents preliminary 
evidence for the specific cases of Argentina and Brazil.  The results are limited by 
scarce and consistent data on FDI policies and the conclusions are, therefore, opened to 
further research. 
 
II. FDI FLOWS TO BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA: STYLIZED 
FACTS  
 
Obstfeld and Taylor (2002: 24 and 25) have put together an historical description of 
world foreign capital stock that places current flows in a broader chronological context.  
Data provided by these authors show how in 1900 foreign stock liabilities in Latin 
America represented around 16% of global liabilities.  This percentage increased to 
almost 20% by 1914 and reached a maximum of 23% in 1960.  Interestingly enough, in 
1995, Latin American foreign stock constituted just a mere 4% of global liabilities.  
 
There is an appealing story behind these figures.  First, the Latin American region has 
been relatively well integrated into the world economy since the beginning of the XXth 
century.  Secondly, the relative decrease in the aforementioned percentage between 
1960 and 1995 when contrasted with World Bank and UNCTAD data seem to indicate 
that capital flows were not simply displaced from Latin American to other developing 
countries but rather to the developed world.  Finally, the numbers provided by Obstfeld 
and Taylor are a reminder that we should analyze with caution the vast amount of 
literature that praises the increase in capital flows to Latin America in the last decade of 
the XXth century. 
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The composition of capital flows to Latin American countries has significantly changed 
since 1970.  First of all, there has been a shift in favor of private flows vis-à-vis official 
flows.   Official flows played a significant role as an external financing source during 
the 1970s and 1980s.  Although they reached several peaks during the financial crises of 
Mexico, Ecuador, Brazil, and Argentina respectively due to the intervention of 
multilateral financial institutions, official flows have exhibited a decreasing trend since 
1991. 
   
Diagram I. Composition of Capital Flows to Latin America (current US$, millions) 
 Source: Author’s own elaboration on data from WDI CD-Rom (2007) 
 
Secondly, there is a relative shift from debt to equity flows that begins at the end of the 
1980s and has continued during the 1990s although not at the same pace.  This shift 
reflects reduction in bank financing and the increase in FDI allocated to Latin American 
countries especially after 1991.  According to Griffith-Jones (2000), the change is also a 
result of the increasing role played by mutual and pension funds as suppliers of foreign 
capital. Finally, FDI has gradually acquired a relevant role as a source of external 
financing.  FDI flows have approximately multiplied by a factor of 20 between 1970 
and 2005.  In terms of GDP, gross FDI flows to Latin America increased from 1.15% of 
GDP in 1975 to 2.12% in 1995 and reached a maximum of almost 6% in 1999.  The 
stock data is more revealing, FDI stocks as a percentage of GDP increased from merely 
6.5% in 1980 to 10.4% in 1990 reaching 34% in 2005 (UNCTAD FDI Online 
Database).
1
   
 
The aforementioned figures clearly reflect the crucial role played by FDI in the Latin 
American region. It is key to note that FDI during the 1990s has mainly flowed to just a 
few Latin American economies, mainly Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.  We will 
focus on the flows received by Argentina and Brazil within the broader context of 
MERCOSUR. 
 
Diagram II evidences the importance of both Argentina and Brazil as recipients of FDI 
flows in relation to the total of Latin American and Caribbean countries. In 1970, FDI 
flows to both countries represented 41% of total FDI to Latin America (excluding the 
Caribbean).  This percentage increased to almost 48% in 1980 and reached a maximum 
of 60% in 1999.   
 
 
                                                 
1 FDI stocks in Latin America accounted for 8% of the world’s total in 2005
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Diagram II: FDI Inflows, Latin America and Argentina & Brazil, 1970-2005 
(Current US million $) 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on data from UNCTAD online database  
 
Argentina has been the pioneer among MERCOSUR countries in opening its economy 
to foreign investors.  Widespread privatization, trade liberalization and opening of the 
financial account were among the reforms enacted in 1991 aimed toward the 
liberalization and stabilization of the economy.  The relative success of these reforms, in 
terms of rapid economic growth until 1997 and historic low levels of inflation, the 
speedy liberalization of FDI legislation, the characteristics of the privatization program, 
and the attractiveness created by MERCOSUR all coincided with a propitious 
environment for foreign investment at the source countries, especially in the European 
Union.  The deep debt and currency crisis that swept the country in 2001, the recession 
and political instability all precipitated a hefty reduction in the volume of capital 
flowing to the country.
2
     
 
FDI inflows have helped to finance the increasing current account deficits that 
Argentina experienced during the 1990s. In 1980 FDI financed 16.5% of the current 
account deficit. This percentage augmented to 57% in 1992 reaching almost 80% in 
1995.  In terms of percentage of GDP, FDI represented 0.74% as an average of the 
period 1980-1990 increasing to 2.20% in 1990-2000.  
 
According to data compiled from the Dirección Nacional de Cuentas Internacionales of 
the Ministerio de Economía y Producción, the privatization process that started in 
Argentina in 1990 explains a significant amount of the FDI inflows that entered the 
country between 1991 and 2000.  67% of the capital that turned to the privatization 
process during the period 1990 to 1999 was foreign.  FDI represented around 51% of 
the total collected for privatization during the same period.  Finally, the average FDI 
flows allocated to Argentina during the 1990s as a result of privatization processes is 
22%.  This percentage was higher at the beginning of the decade reaching 40% at the 
height of the privatization process. 
 
Brazil has long been considered the “clumsy” reformer.  The failures of successive 
stabilization plans in correcting the inflationary problem together with a relative delay 
in adopting market-oriented reforms overshadowed the attractiveness of Brazil as a host 
for FDI, particularly when taking into account the size of its market.  However, the 
stabilization and economic reform package adopted during the mid-1990s, the 
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In comparison with other emerging countries, markets such as Brazil also suffered a vast reduction of almost 70% between 2001 and 2003.   It is important to 
note that emerging markets such as China and India experienced increases of 4% and 8% respectively.   
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privatization process that started in 1994, and the relative liberalization of the external 
accounts, among other factors, propitiated a dramatic increase in FDI inflows.   
 
As a percentage of GDP, the stock of FDI shows in Brazil an increase from 7.6% in 
1980 to 25.1% in 2005. In terms of flows, FDI reaches its maximum record as a 
percentage of GDP in the year 2000 displaying a 5.4%.  Between 1998 and 2002, FDI 
plays a key role financing increasing percentages of the current account deficit.  
 
There are several FDI inflows features shared by both Argentina and Brazil that are 
worth mentioning. First of all, both countries attract “resource-seeking”, “market-
seeking” and relatively low levels of “efficiency-seeking” FDI.  Secondly, linked to the 
privatization processes, entry through mergers and acquisitions has been significant in 
both countries with acquisitions more prevalent than mergers. Finally, in both countries 
FDI has played a key role in the financing of external disequilibria.  
 
 
II. OPENING UP TO FDI: AT WHAT COST? 
 
 
FDI liberalization is not an easy task from a political-economy point of view. Foreign 
investment is a more sensitive political issue than international trade since it implies 
foreign ownership of domestic resources.  When policy-makers face the decision to 
open up the economy to foreign investment, they compare the marginal costs and the 
marginal benefits inherent to such liberalization.  In this section, I will present a 
succinct summary of the political economy advantages and costs of FDI inflows for a 
emerging host economy aiming to improve the understanding of the choices faced by 
the policy maker. Additionally, grasping costs and benefits helps us discern winners and 
losers and forecast their reactions. I start by precisely defining the concept of FDI 
liberalization that will be used in the following sections. 
 
Defining FDI Liberalization 
 
FDI liberalization encompasses a wide range of issues that range from admission 
procedures to different types of incentives and even the macro and microeconomic 
policies that attract FDI to specific locations.  UNCTAD (several years) distinguishes 
three generations of FDI liberalization policies: 
 
(a) Liberalization policies: Policies geared towards the reduction of barriers that 
prohibit FDI flows from entering the domestic market. Liberalization also includes 
standards of treatment of foreign investment. 
 
(b) Facilitation and Active promotion of FDI: This set of policies aim to actively 
attract general FDI by adopting instruments such as Investment Promotion Agencies.  
 
(c) Adoption of targeted investment incentives: This more recent generation of 
policies seeks to draw specific types of FDI (from particular sectors, industries, and 
even countries) considered compatible with the host-economy development strategy.  
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This study focuses on the first generation policies given that it is the dismantling of 
barriers to FDI in specific sectors and the adoption of national treatment standards what 
allowed foreign investors to invest in emerging economies.
3
 Furthermore, the adoption 
of liberalization policies is more complex and controversial than the other two sets of 
policies.  
 
Political Economy Benefits and Costs of FDI Liberalization 
 
The benefits inherent to FDI inflows have long been praised by the economic literature 
and particularly those related to technological spillovers and its medium and long-term 
influence on economic growth.  The “traditional” arguments defending the positive 
economic contributions of FDI have generally focused on five principal categories: 
 
(a) FDI contributes to closing the gap between domestic savings and investment 
demand. This is especially relevant for emerging economies that commonly face 
external disequilibria. It is noteworthy that the average Latin American rate of savings is 
relatively low, approximately 20 percent of GDP on average for the last two decades), 
when compared with that of East Asian countries, which surpasses 30 percent of GDP 
(WDI Database, 2007).  
 
(b) The positive spill over effects related to technological advances and 
improvement of managerial techniques help domestic firms to overcome the deficits in 
technological and know-how inherited from decades of inefficient protectionism 
(Agosín, ed. 1995 and Blomström and Kokko, 1997 and 1998).
4
 Moreover, foreign 
investment can complement domestic investment if it allows an enhanced use of the 
existing productive capacity and it brings in “missing” factors of production 
complementary to those available locally
5
; 
 
(c) FDI is advantageous to other forms of foreign capital given that such capital 
inflows are driven by fundamentals and not by high short-term profit seeking.  
Moreover, the fact that FDI is bolted down implies that the capital will remain in the 
host country, even in the event of an external shock or an adverse domestic political-
economic environment.
6
 Both features imply that FDI should be a relatively more stable 
source of financing vis-à-vis other capital flows (Lipsey, 2001 and Loungani and Razin, 
2001); 
 
(d) When operating in a regional free trade environment, FDI promotes the benefits 
of economies of scale and rationalization of production.  In so doing, it increases the 
access of the host country to international export markets (Levy Yeyati et al, 2003); 
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Agosín and Machado (2006) find that approval procedures and the percentage of foreign ownership allowed are the variables that exert a larger influence on the 
volume of FDI inflows.
 
4 Borensztein, de Gregorio and Lee (1998) and Saggi (2000) have demonstrated that FDI contributes to economic growth by transferring technology, but only 
when the host country enjoys a minimum level of human capital.   
5 Markusen and Venables (1999) analyze the conditions under which foreign and domestic investment are complementary.  Under such conditions, FDI inflows 
can increase the number of domestic firms. According to Chudnovsky and López (2001) the inflow of FDI to MERCOSUR countries has in fact displaced 
domestic investment in several sectors. 
6 Hausmann and Fernández-Arias (2000) highlight that FDI is just a firm’s liability and, as such, is not fully bolted down to the host-market.   
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(e) By enhancing competition within the host country, FDI contributes to further 
economic liberalization and deregulation and diminishes the possibilities of retreat from 
the market-oriented reform processes, and 
 
Finally, FDI flows engender distributional consequences through changes in factor and 
product prices.  Following standard international economic theory, free capital 
movement generates a redistribution of income both at the home and the host 
economies.  At the host economy, income pours from capital to labor since the 
additional capital (foreign) reduces the return to domestic capital while the labor factor 
experiences an increase in its marginal return.
7
 
 
These arguments are constantly reviewed in the literature giving rise to interesting 
results.  Many of the sources consulted coincide in attributing a potential positive effect 
of FDI on the economic growth of developing economies.
8
  However, the empirical 
relationship between FDI inflows and economic growth is still subject to an intense 
debate. 
 
The question that the benefits highlighted by the literature brings to mind is, if FDI is a 
stable source of financing of external unbalances and, under certain conditions, it 
enhances economic growth, why do developed and developing economies have had a 
historical tendency to remain closed to foreign investment?
9
 A review of the economic, 
political, and economic-policy design costs inherent to FDI liberalization can shed some 
light on this question.  
 
The economic costs related to opening up the market to FDI translate into incentives to 
modify both “ex-ante” and “ex-post” the course of policy-making. Within the potential 
economic costs, I have selected those prone to create incentives in economic agents to 
act “politically.” 
 
(a) Large FDI inflows could exert upward pressure on real exchange rates. This is 
especially relevant in the context of fixed exchange rates. The increase in real exchange 
rate can encourage an increase in imports and worsen the international competitiveness 
level of the host economy.  This, in turn, propitiates changes in national income 
redistribution.  
 
(b) Anti-competitive practices: Anti competitive practices by MNCs are particularly 
relevant in oligopolistic markets. The extent of such practices depends on the regulatory 
framework prevalent at the host. For the specific case of emerging markets that 
followed so-called first generation reforms, the design of competition law and 
regulatory frameworks was left for a second round of reforms.  
  
(c) Crowding-out of domestic capital: The literature has identified two channels that 
explain the crowding-out of domestic capital, reducing the return to domestic capital 
and borrowing in the domestic market.  The reduction in domestic capital returns is, in 
turn, explained by the reduction in factor price and the decrease in product prices.  In 
                                                 
7 For an extension of this argument within an overlapping-generations model, see Alfaro (2004). 
8 The World Bank has carried out a compilation of the literature on the effects of FDI on several economic and institutional variables.  The surveys are available at 
http://rru.worldbank.org/PapersLinks/Impact-Foreign-Direct-Investment/ 
9 Lake (in Weingast and Wittman eds. 2006) argues that openness to FDI has been historically rare. Singh (2003) highlights that both the United States and Japan 
have strict rules governing foreign investment in strategic sectors.  
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market-seeking FDI the crowding-out effect is even more salient. Agosín and Machado 
(2005) highlight that the effect of FDI on domestic investment depends on the features 
of the sector(s) where it flows. The results of the econometric exercised developed by 
the authors suggest that crowd-out of domestic investment did indeed happen in Latin 
American economies between 1970 and 1996. 
 
(d) FDI, if it flows to capital and technology intensive sectors, has an ambiguous 
impact on employment potentially displacing unskilled workers from the labor market. 
It is important to note that while economic theory predicts that labor should be pro-FDI, 
economic sociology argues that unions feel threatened by foreign capital since it 
weakens their bargaining position (Guillén, 2001).  The author argues that organized 
labor’s position vis-à-vis foreign investment is shaped by both the political regime type 
the economic attitude of organized labor that he classifies as either modernizing or 
populist. 
 
(e)  Financial volatility/ Reversal of FDI: Cutting edge literature has recently began 
to acknowledge that FDI might not be as stable as previously thought. New 
developments are based on the availability of alternative sources of data that show how 
MNCs can use financial techniques to divest from specific countries (Hausmann and 
Fernández Arias, 2000 and Razin, various years).
10
   
 
The costs in terms of policy making are related to both the benefits and costs inherent to 
FDI calling for action in several fields.
11
 First the inflow of foreign exchange could 
require the intervention of the economic authorities if it generates a disproportionate 
increase in aggregate demand together with an appreciation of the exchange rate.   Both 
effects are relevant in fast-growing economies, which tend to receive high levels of 
capital flows. Secondly, the control of domestic firms by foreigners, especially in 
strategic sectors such as public utilities and banking, could entail the involvement of 
regulatory bodies and changes to the regulatory framework. Moreover, Rodrik (2000) 
argues that the liberalization of the foreign investment regime is not a matter of simply 
changing regulations but it requires drastic changes at the institutional level that entail, 
in turn, costs in financial, bureaucratic and even political terms. Finally, financial 
volatility has a significant impact on economic policy making, especially on those 
countries that display large current account deficits. 
 
Another concern for the policy-maker regarding FDI is social stability which is a 
relatively unexplored issue.   Borrowing from the political economy literature on trade 
(Krasner, 1976), I suggest that the adjustment of domestic production to international 
patterns and the movement of labor and capital across production sectors could 
introduce distortions into the social framework.   
 
Finally, FDI entails foreign ownership of domestic resources. This brings to the table 
issues of national sovereignty that are particularly acute when FDI is materialized in 
mergers or acquisitions in sectors perceived as vital by the citizens.  
 
To sum up, up until recently the literature on the benefits associated to FDI appeared 
more convincing than the scarce economic scholarly work on the costs that FDI could 
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While  borrowing intensively from host capital markets against collateral has also been used to reverse the direction of FDI, this practice is less common in 
developing countries.
  
11 For a detailed description of the economic policies designed to deal with capital inflows, see Montiel (2003, chapter 15). 
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bring to the host economy.  Both strands of literature suggest the following political 
economy outcomes that will be further developed in the next section. First, openness to 
FDI, if successful in attracting flows, increases the size of the economic pie in the long-
term but it is associated, in the short to medium term, with distributive conflicts due to 
changes in the prices of factors of production and products.  FDI can complement 
domestic labor raising its marginal productivity and therefore its retribution. 
Meanwhile, inflows of foreign capital can crowd-out domestic investment decreasing 
the income of capital owners.  Secondly, FDI flows generate positive externalities 
(technological and managerial spillovers) and backward and forward linkages with 
domestic capital.  I suggest that these advantages particularly benefit skilled workers 
and owners of non-specific assets that are easily transferable to other sectors of 
production. Finally, economic policy-making is severely affected by large capital 
inflows in their ability to manipulate the exchange rate; to exercise competition policy 
and to design regulatory frameworks. 
 
III. A DYNAMIC POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH TO 
FDI LIBERALIZATION 
 
 
FDI liberalization can be analyzed as a game between winners and losers determined by 
their access to the political system and, as any other policy, it is an equilibrium outcome 
of the political process. 
12
  The political process is, in turn, a result of the interaction of 
individuals constrained by institutional (both formal and informal) rules. Distinguishing 
between expected winners and losers and real winners and losers enables us to 
distinguish between the “ex-ante” (static approach) and the “ex-post” (dynamic 
approach).
13
  
 
Expected winners and losers have incentives to exert pressure on FDI policy-makers 
before the liberalization measures are adopted.  Real winners and losers have incentives 
to exert pressure on policy-makers to change the course of action. The bargaining 
process between winners, losers and the government is not a static game. Each player 
continually estimates the timing and extent of his concessions.  Winners and losers tend 
to organize in groups to increase their degree of influence and any specific group will be 
able to exert more influence on the government the greater its internal cohesion and 
organizational ability is (Olson, 1965; Frieden, 1991 and Keefer, 2004). Moreover, a 
given group will invest more in exerting influence over policies the more difficult it is 
to transfer their assets to other uses (firms operating natural resources and capital-
intensive firms with assets not easily transferable and unskilled workers). 
 
In our ex-ante framework, we should expect, therefore, that firms who own non-
transferable assets and unskilled workers in sectors where FDI can increase the demand 
for skilled labor would seek to influence the government not to liberalize FDI, to adopt 
a restricted-liberalization or to obtain compensations.  On the other hand, skilled 
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The political economy literature widely acknowledges that agents will seek to influence government’s decisions if the government policies are expected to 
impact private welfare (Przeworski, 2003). 
13
 
This distinction is key in emerging economies, such as Argentina, where FDI liberalization was adopted “by surprise” bundled with a broader package of 
structural reforms and stabilization policies during the so-called honeymoon period. 
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workers and firms that could benefit by supplying MNCs or forming strategic alliances 
with them would favor liberalization.   
 
The distinction between owners of transferable vis-à-vis non-transferable assets in 
emerging economies requires taking business groups into account. Diversified business 
groups are prevalent in emerging economies as a response to less developed institutions. 
Khanna and Yafeh (2007) argue that they normally develop under government 
protection but as the groups evolve the relations become more complex. One key feature 
of business groups is that their diversified activities allow them to transfer assets to 
other activities relatively easier. In this sense, if capital flows crowd-out domestic 
investment in one specific sector, firms that belong to business groups have the ability 
to transfer their assets to other activities.  
 
From the perspective of the factors of production, I suggest that we need to take into 
account the following features of each production factor.  
 
a) The labor factor stance towards FDI depends on several factors. First, the sector 
where FDI flows.  When foreign capital flows to capital and technology intensive 
sectors it generates an increase in the relative demand and wages of skilled workers vis-
à-vis unskilled workers. Secondly, it depends on the entry form.  FDI through mergers 
and acquisitions tends to have a negative effect on employment. Finally, the effect on 
labor will depend on the proportion between high-skilled workers and low-skilled 
workers.  As a result, if FDI flows to sectors that are intensive in capital and technology 
and enters through mergers or acquisitions it could result in a negative impact on 
employment. Such impact would be more salient for unskilled workers particularly in 
economies where there is scarce capital available to improve workers’ capabilities and 
where labor market flexibility is restricted.    
 
 
b) Domestic capital approach to FDI liberalization will depend on several factors. First, 
it will depend on the expected effect on the return to capital. Secondly, on the degree of 
asset specifity which, in emerging economies, is partially determined by the relation of 
each firm to business groups. Finally, the ability to extract rents from the liberalization 
process by, for example, becoming suppliers to the MNCs or participating, together 
with foreign companies, in the privatization process.  
 
The traditional political economy argument that sustains that labor favors FDI 
liberalization while capital opposes has generally been followed by the prediction that, 
since labor usually enjoys a larger access to the political system when the left is in 
power, leftist parties are expected to welcome FDI. My analysis for emerging 
economies, suggests that this is not a clear-cut conclusion given that there is no such 
thing as a unified position vis-à-vis FDI liberalization neither by labor nor by capital. 
 
As part of the approach, I also take into account the macroeconomic environment 
prevalent at the time of the announcement of FDI liberalization.  The influence of this 
variable is probably higher in emerging economies given their tendency to volatile 
macroeconomic scenarios.  In this sense, the political economy literature on economic 
 12 
reforms widely agrees that structural reforms are politically easier to adopt in a context 
of acute economic crisis (Kuczinsky and Williamson, 2003 and Paunovic, 2000).
14
  
 
Kobrin (2005) identifies two principal and interrelated reasons that incite governments 
to open the door to FDI.  First, the increasing opportunity cost of closure determined by 
the loss in terms of efficiency.
15
 This concept is based on Garret’s “increasing cost of 
closure”. Garret (2000) highlights that despite the volatility and uncertainty associated 
to openness, the cost of closure is probably the most important determinant of the FDI 
liberalization process.
16
  These arguments are in line with a non-utilitarist approach that 
assumes that the government is insulated from interest groups and seeks to maximize 
citizens’ welfare by increasing output.  
 
Secondly, Kobrin suggests that external pressures by developed countries partners in 
foreign trade and by multilateral institutions partners
17
 also forces governments to 
liberalize their FDI regimes. Stallings (1992) suggests that the presence of external 
constraints increases the political influence of technocrats that are more internationally 
oriented and uses the example of the Argentine Peronist’s alliance with internationally-
connected groups.  The debt crisis together with the failure of Keynesian economic 
recipes changed the approach used by multilateral institutions, such as the IMF, to 
analyze external disequilibria in Latin America.  It is within this context that the 
conditionality clauses attached to loan granting and renewals incorporated the opening 
of the capital account.  Within this external influence, I also include the indirect 
pressure exerted by the desire to comply with the prevalent economic model that incites 
governments to emulate policy choices of other countries.
18
 
 
To adapt the analysis to emerging economies, I suggest that indicators such as the 
current account balance, inflation levels, and external debt should be taken into account 
to analyze both the opportunity cost of remaining closed and the degree of pressure that 
could be exerted by foreign governments and multilateral institutions.
19
 Here, the 
dynamic approach also becomes relevant given that the higher the current account and 
fiscal deficits, the larger the influence and the bargaining power of international 
organizations and foreign firms.  
 
While FDI is a long-term flow and therefore policies that tackle FDI are not perceived 
as short-term solutions to economic crisis, it is possible that the flows are interpreted as 
a partial way out of slow rates of economic growth.  Additionally, various governments 
have camouflaged liberalization policies within a stabilization package deemed by the 
electorate as vital.
20
  This is the case of privatization and FDI liberalization that in many 
emerging economies were adopted together with stabilization plans.  Moreover, the 
stance of both capital and labor towards the liberalization process can change as the 
                                                 
14 It is important to mention that there are authors who partially disagree with this statement. Dixit (2003), for example, contends that deep economic crisis are 
sometimes not enough to suppress vested interests. Some interest groups can remain and even retain enough veto power to block reform legislation. 
15 The opportunity cost of closure is calculated by considering: market size, level of development, GDP growth, trade openness, human resources, democracy. 
16 Garret’s concept is based on Krasner’s analysis of the “relative opportunity cost of closure” for international trade (Krasner, 1976: 21). 
17 The external pressure is measured by: dependence on the US (trade and FDI), dependence on international institutions (obligations to the WB or the IMF). 
18
 
This reason to liberalize FDI regimes has been addressed by Kobrin and Xu
n
 (2005) 
19 In the specific  context of  emerging economies, the government shows a utility function that includes credibility restrictions related to “international 
obligations.” 
20
 
It is worth mentioning that of 33 governments that implemented market-oriented reforms between 1982 and 1995, only 17 announced it during their campaigns 
(Stokes cited in Lora and Olivera, 2005).
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inflow of foreign capital alter their preferences through the impact on their share of 
income.   
 
IV. AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY TO RESULTS IN 
ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL 
 
This section presents a brief analysis of the FDI liberalization processes in both 
Argentina and Brazil and a proposal for the analysis of its determinants. It is important 
to keep in mind that in both countries FDI liberalization was adopted within the 
framework of structural reform packages.  It is, therefore, complicated to isolate both 
the effects of foreign flows and the attitude towards FDI liberalization.  Trade 
liberalization, privatization, different exchange rate arrangements and the drastic 
reduction of the role of the State in the market all interact with the liberalization of 
capital flows.  
 
Before introducing the results, it is interesting to review OECD’s FDI Regulatory 
Restrictiveness Index for both countries for 2006.
21
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Source: Author’s own elaboration on OECD index (2006). The index ranks between 0 and 1 (0 open, 1 
closed).  
 
These figures indicate that FDI restrictions in the OCDE are higher in sectors such as 
business services, telecommunications and transport (higher than Argentina’s but lower 
than Brazil’s) and electricity. It is key to highlight that the former were completely 
closed to foreign capital in both Argentina and Brazil until the early 1990s suggesting 
that the liberalization effort has been massive and has not been reverted so far.  
 
ARGENTINA 
 
Argentina is considered a textbook case regarding its alternation in liberal and 
restrictive FDI policies. While in the 1940s under the Peronist regime MNCs were 
accused of looting natural resources and exploiting labor, this attitude was abandoned in 
times of economic crisis and replaced by a relative acceptance of foreign capital.  
 
During the democratic transition that took place after 1983 under the Alfonsín 
government, the unions opposed the opening of the economy. However, the desperate 
economic situation of the late 1980s opened the door for liberalization of both trade and 
                                                 
21 Unfortunately, OECD only provides time-series data on the index for OECD countries. 
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capital flows speedily transforming Argentina in one of the most foreign capital-opened 
emerging economies. Foreign companies may invest in Argentina without registration 
or prior government approval, and on the same terms as domestic investors.  Investors 
are free to enter Argentina through merger, acquisition, greenfield investment, or joint 
venture.  
 
Table I shows that Argentina’s policy framework was, in 1996, more FDI-friendly in 
every category than the average for the most important recipients of FDI in the Latin 
American region.  
 
Table I. FDI REGIME-RELATED BARRIERS IN LATIN AMERICA
22
 
 ARGENTINA BRAZIL LAC (a) 
Acquisition of Control (1) 9.6 7.0 8.2 
Equal Treatment (2) 8.6 7.9 7.8 
Employment of Foreigners(3) 
(3) 
9.2 7.1 8.1 
Strategic Alliances (4) 7.2 6.7 6.5 
Cross Border Ventures (5) 9.4 6.8 7.9 
Investment Protection (6) 6.5 5.1 5.8 
Overall Assessment (7) 8.4 6.8 7.4 
Source: IFC, 1996. Scaled from 0 (least favorable) to 10 (most favorable).   
 
The following table summarizes major changes to the FDI regime and the adoption of 
measures that affect FDI.  
 
Table II. ARGENTINA:  FDI LIBERALIZATION PROCESS & RELATED 
POLICIES (1989-2005) 
Year Measure Type 
1989 State’s Reform Law 23696 
1990 Start of privatization  
1991 Deregulation of domestic and international 
trade 
Decree 2284 
1991 Convertibility Law  
1991 Creation of MERCOSUR  
1992 Promotion of domestic and foreign mineral 
investment 
Decree 815 
1993 National Treatment 
Unrestricted access to all sectors 
No performance requirements 
No registration and approval 
Executive order 1853 
1993 Deregulation of public utilities Gas Act. Executive Decree  2731 
1993 Brady Plan  
1994 ICSID Member  
1996 Provincial banks privatization  
2000 Patent Law  
2000 Limited labor reform   
2001 Capital Controls Decree 1570 
                                                 
22 (a) Average for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. (1) Foreign investors may not acquire (0)/are free (10) to acquire control in a 
domestic company. (2) Foreigners are not treated (0)/are treated (10) equally to citizens. (3) Immigration laws prevent (0)/do not prevent (10) your company from 
employing foreign firms. (4) Strategic alliances are not common (0)/ are common (10) between domestic and foreign firms. (5) Cross border ventures cannot being 
negotiated with foreign partners without government imposed restraint (0)/ can be negotiated freely. (6) Investment protection schemes are not (0)/ are available 
for most foreign partner countries (10). (7) Average assessment according to criteria (1)-(6).  
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2002 Pesification of bank accounts and contracts 
Renegotiation of public utility services 
agreements 
Public Emergency Law 
2003 Restrictions to foreign ownership of cultural 
goods 
 
2003 Limited capital controls (short-term capital) Decree 285 
2004 Limited labor reform  
2004 Software promotion regime Law 25922 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on data from UNCTAD (various years), American Chamber of 
Commerce (Argentina), Heymann (2000), and US Department of State (2006). 
 
Argentina does not seem to have introduced radical changes to its liberal FDI regime 
adopted during the Washington Consensus era.  However, the country has indirectly 
altered the FDI-related policy framework by frequently changing regulations, especially 
since 2002, that affect foreign investors such as the bankruptcy law, foreign exchange 
regulations for oil and gas companies, mandatory reductions in energy exports, as well 
as changes to the conditions for renegotiation of public utility contracts.  As a result, 
there has been a large increase in the ICSID number of cases against the country and, at 
least in five procedures, it has been considered that it has violated specific dispositions 
contained in investment agreements signed by the country.  These events explain why 
the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom reflects a decrease in the investment index.  
 
Diagram III: Argentina and Brazil: Investment Freedom Index  
Source: Author’s own elaboration on Heritage’s index of economic freedom. The category used is 
the investment score defined as “an assessment of the free flow of capital, especially foreign capital.”23  
 
From a political economy perspective, Argentine business groups have traditionally 
partnered with MNEs.  Under President Menem, the groups suffered from increased 
competition as a consequence of the liberalization of international trade but they were 
“compensated” with a reduction in union’s power, renewed ties with MNEs and 
participation in the privatization process (Guillén, 2001 and Bambaci et al, 1999).  The 
data on fixed investment by capital origin points to a relative crowding-out effect on 
domestic investment.  
                                                 
23 The index moves between 0 and 100 with 50 meaning “Foreign investors face restrictions on their ability to purchase real estate. All investors face bureaucratic 
impediments and corruption. Residents and/or non-residents face some restrictions on access to foreign exchange or their ability to conduct international payments. 
Transfers or capital transactions are subject to obvious restrictions.” 
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Diagram IV: Fixed Investment of Large Firms: Domestic and Foreign Firms  
(millions of constant pesos) 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on data from INDEC  
 
The possibility of crowding out does not seem to have affected capital’s attitude toward 
foreign investment even in a post-privatization context where opportunities for 
“compensation” are fewer. In this sense, private business groups such as Fundación 
Invertir have renewed their efforts to attract foreign investment to the country.
24
 
 
Regarding labor, data for the 500 largest firms (excluding financial firms) indicates that 
between 1993 and 2004 there was a reduction of 46% in jobs in firms owned by 
domestic capital while there is a 40% increase in jobs in foreign firms. A large 
percentage of the stock of FDI in 2004 concentrated in manufacturing and in the oil 
sectors where labor needs are relatively less skilled than in other sectors such as 
services. However, the services sector also received large flows of FDI increasing the 
demand for skilled labor.  The results are, therefore, unclear. [incomplete] 
 
Guillén (2001) classifies the Argentine labor unions as populist and sustains that they 
perceive foreign capital as a necessary evil.  Moreover, their political affiliation with the 
Peronist party and Menem´s strategy of division and delaying labor market reform 
diminished their incentives to act against economic policies.
25
   
 
The relation between the political orientation of the executive party and FDI 
liberalization is measured by plotting a proxy for FDI liberalization against the political 
orientation of the chief executive party. This exercise delivers results that differ from 
the political economy conclusions given that it is the right (capital factor of production) 
who liberalizes FDI. However, given the prevalent influence of the Peronist party in 
Argentine politics, it is complicated to define chief executive party orientations along 
the lines of center, left and right.  Moreover, the index is affected by the temporary 
adoption of short-term capital controls.  
 
 
                                                 
24 See Fundación Invertir web page at www.invertir.com 
25 A survey conducted in 1991 found that 68% of the population supported privatization and 77% favored a more open economy. Workers under the CGT, the 
most influential Argentine union, also favored these  policies (Cardoso, 2004). In 2003, support for privatization was just above 10% (Panizza and Yañez, 2006).  
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Diagram V. Argentina: Executive Party Orientation and FDI Liberalization 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on data from Fraser Institute (2006) and World Bank Political 
Institutions Database. Index for FDI liberalization measures restrictions in foreign capital market 
exchange (Index of capital controls among 13 IMF categories). The index moves between 0 (restrictions 
in most categories) and 10 (liberalized regime). There is a change on the index’s methodology after the 
year 2001. 
 
The analysis of the relative influence of the “cost of closure” and external pressures will 
be conducted at the end of this section to incorporate the results for Brazil.  
 
BRAZIL 
 
Da Motta Veiga (2004) characterizes the Brazilian FDI regime of the ISI period as 
stable and relatively liberal despite the political changes.
26
 Only during the 1980s did 
the policies retracted from the liberal regime. As Table III suggests, the most important 
step in FDI liberalization took place in 1995 when the Cardoso government amended 
the Constitution to give FDI national treatment. A comparison with Argentina indicates 
that the liberalization process started later, as the other policies of the Washington 
Consensus, and it was implemented on a more gradual fashion. Despite the acute 
political change that took place when Lula took office in 2003, no liberalizing measures 
have been reversed so far although international investors complain about regulatory 
risk. 
 
Table III. BRAZIL: FDI LIBERALIZATION PROCESS & RELATED 
POLICIES (1989-2005) 
Year Measure Type 
1990 Privatization process  Law 8031 
1990 Competition law Law 8002 
1991 Foreign investors allowed to invest in stock 
market 
 
1991 Removal of entry restrictions in information-
technology 
 
1994 Real Plan  
1994 Antitrust law Law 8884 
1995 National Treatment 
Entry restrictions (specific sectors) 
Entry in financial sector allowed ad hoc 
Constitution Amendment 
                                                 
26 UNCTAD (2005) sustains that FDI was accepted in sectors where it did not interfere with state and private sector activity.  
Proxy for FDI Liberalization and Chief Executive Party
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Required registration and review 
Performance requirements (employment, 
national content)
27
 
Reduction of state-owned monopolies 
1997 Telecommunications Liberalization 
Creation of the regulator ANATEL 
General Telecommunications Law 
1999 Devaluation of the real  
2000 Foreigners allowed to invest in capital and 
financial markets 
Resolution 2689 (Brazilian 
Monetary Council) 
2000 Registration of foreign investment no longer 
subject to Central Bank review 
Circular 2997 
2002 Foreign ownership in media outlets limited to 
30% (previously closed) 
Law 10610 
2002 Creation of Investe Brasil  
2004 APEX Brasil creates an investment unit  
Source: Author’s own elaboration on data from UNCTAD (various years), Da Motta Veiga (2004), 
ECLAC (various years), US Department of State (2006),.  
 
Although Da Motta Veiga (2004) states that “foreign capital is viewed with sympathy 
by the large majority of political currents and parties” a principal labor union, the CUT, 
opposed the market-oriented reforms. Population surveys drastically differ from the 
ones conducted in Argentina displaying that public opinion did not favor economic 
reforms.
28
  According to ECLAC (2004), MNCs in Brazil employ relatively few people. 
In the manufacturing sector, foreign firms tend to pay relatively higher wages given 
their superior technologies.  The Brazilian labor market is among the most flexible ones 
in Latin America in terms of reallocation of jobs and wage flexibility.  [Incomplete] 
 
Regarding capital, Brazilian legislation does not define or distinguish business groups 
for fiscal purposes. This complicates the analysis due to the lack of data. Bonelli (1998) 
and Siffert Filho et al (1999) find that FDI inflows allowed business groups to bypass 
the financing restrictions that had traditionally characterized their performance by 
forming alliances between themselves and with foreign capital. Such reaction could 
indicate that large business groups do not have enough incentives, in a dynamic 
approach, to exert influence to reverse the FDI liberalization process.   
 
The relationship between chief executive party orientation and the degree of FDI 
liberalization shows, contrary to the Argentine case, that FDI liberalization is 
implemented by a leftist political party.  As already mentioned, the general population 
and some of the trade unions opposed the reform process. As displayed in table III, the 
liberalization coincides with the gradual implementation of market-oriented reforms.  
 
                                                 
27 It is difficult to account for all the performance requirements since a vast majority are not enacted by law but rather by administrative procedures. 
28 In 1990, just 30% of Brazilians favored privatization. By 1998 that rate had increased to 52% (Cardoso, 2004). 
 19 
Diagram VI. Brazil: Executive Party Orientation and FDI Liberalization 
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Source: See diagram V 
 
 
To complete this section, I introduce a comparison of the role played by the cost of 
closure in times of economic crisis. As mentioned before, I consider that Kobrin’s 
opportunity cost of closure and the pressure of external players are intimately related at 
the time that Argentina and Brazil liberalized their FDI regimes.  Diagram VII shows 
that both have displayed since the early 1980s soaring levels of external debt.  
 
Diagram VII. Argentina and Brazil: External Debt (% of GDP) 
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Source: Author’s own elaboration on data from WDI CD-Rom Database, 2007 
 
As a proportion of GDP, the Argentine economy experiences three drastic increases in 
its external debt levels in 1982, in 1989 and again in 2001. While the episodes during 
the 1980s did in fact encourage the liberalization of capital flows, the last one is 
followed by an increase in the tension with foreign investors regarding specific 
regulations and negotiations of tariffs.  In the Brazilian case, external debt increases at 
the beginning of the 1980s and again at the beginning of the 1990s. The adoption of 
reforms, including the liberalization of FDI, is to a certain extent a response to very high 
levels of external debt.  
 
External debt levels should not be used in isolation from other variables to measure the 
influence of external actors on the liberalization of FDI policies. To be sure, both 
Argentina and Brazil used debt for equity swaps to deal with the external debt problem.  
These instruments are a domestic option that requires a relative degree of openness to 
international capital flows and, therefore, liberalization. Debt from official creditors and 
the principal rescheduled of official debt offer a more transparent picture of the 
relationship with multilateral organizations. Diagrams VIII and IX display these 
variables for both countries. 
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Diagram VIII. Argentina & Brazil: Debt from Official Creditors (US $ billions) 
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Diagram XI. Argentina & Brazil: Principal Rescheduled, Official Debt (US $ 
millions) 
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Source: Author’s own elaboration on data from Global Development Finance Online Database  
 
This data indicates that the amount of debt from official creditors increases sharply in 
both countries during the pre-reform period. The reschedule of official debt is 
particularly relevant between 1990 and 1993 potentially suggesting that the 
conditionality attached to these operations could have exerted a large influence on the 
design of the reform process, including the liberalization of FDI.  The question is 
whether such influence was large enough to compensate for the economic and political 
costs inherent to FDI liberalization. 
 
A look at the current account balance evolution could partially answer the last question.  
As diagram XII displays, current account deficits have plagued both the Argentine and 
the Brazilian economies   
 
Diagram XII. Argentina & Brazil: Current Account Balance (% of GDP) 
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Source: Author’s own elaboration on data from WDI CD-Rom Database, 2007 
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Both countries display at the end of the 1980s suffocating external imbalances. While 
current account deficits around 4% of the GDP might not be worrisome for healthy 
economies, Argentina and Brazil were experiencing at the same time increasing levels 
of external obligations.  If international reserves were not flowing to the economies 
through exports, then the opening of the capital account probably seemed like the only 
game in town.  Curiously enough, the current account surpluses experienced by the 
Argentine economy since 2002, largely due to the devaluation of the peso, appear to 
coincide with a relative degree of “relaxation” in the FDI liberalization process.  As 
evidenced in diagram VIII, the surpluses also coincide with a reduction in official 
external debt potentially indicating that the ability of the Argentine economy to deal 
with its external obligations has been enhanced while the capacity of international actors 
to exert FDI-liberalization related pressures has diminished. The Brazilian economy 
follows similar patterns although the current account surpluses are not as “healthy” as 
the Argentine ones. 
 
I introduce two final variables, the evolution of GDP and inflation. The first one is used 
to ascertain whether disappointing results in terms of economic growth may have 
encouraged FDI liberalization. The second one is used as an indicator of the willingness 
of the citizens to accept stabilization programs. The stabilization programs were 
accompanied, in many emerging economies, by market-oriented policies that included 
the liberalization of FDI flows.  
 
Economic growth by decade shows disappointing and extremely volatile results in 
Argentina, lower than the Latin American average in every decade but the 1990s. The 
opposite is true for the Brazilian case that experiences relatively high rates until the 
1980s.  
 
Diagram XIII. Argentina, Brazil & LAC: GDP Growth by Decade  
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Source: Paunovic, 2000 
 
The results in terms of economic growth contribute to explain the constant search for 
new development strategies in Argentina.  In the Brazilian case, despite the sharp 
decline in economic growth during the 1980s, the fairly satisfactory results of the state-
led model of economic growth sustain the aforementioned opposition to market-
oriented reforms.  
 
For much of the second half of the XXth century, frequent bouts of high inflation have 
characterized Latin American economies. Diagram XIV shows that both Argentina and 
Brazil suffered from hyperinflation episodes during the late 1980s and the beginning of 
the 1990s.  Figures have been split in two diagrams to illustrate the markedly different 
behavior in consumer prices between the 1980s and the 1990s.  
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Diagram XIV. Argentina & Brazil: Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 
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Source: Author’s own elaboration on data from WDI CD-Rom Database, 2007 
 
As widely recognized by the literature on market reform, hyperinflation episodes enable 
political leaders, even populist ones, to adopt structural reforms sometimes disguised 
with the implementation of stabilization measures designed to fight distorting levels of 
inflation.  A quick look at tables II and III and Diagram XIV suggest that political 
leaders in both countries started to liberalize FDI regimes at the same time that they 
implemented stabilization measures anchored in fixed exchange rates.   
 
V. FINAL REMARKS 
 
According to political economy hypotheses, capital should have opposed the 
liberalization of the FDI regime in both Argentina and Brazil. Furthermore, from a 
dynamic perspective, as the reforms introduced in the 1990s generated relatively 
disappointing results, their attitude toward FDI should have heightened. Meanwhile, 
labor, should have supported FDI liberalization at the beginning of the reform process 
and, depending on their skill-degrees, they should have reviewed their attitude. The 
preliminary results obtained in the previous sections indicate the following 
 
a) Business groups have probably taken advantage of FDI in Argentina and Brazil 
by diversifying activities and forming strategic alliances with foreign capital.  
 
b) Labor has expressed opposition to FDI liberalization in both countries.  The 
impact of FDI on skilled and unskilled labor income is not clear. In Argentina 
there is a reduction in employment by large domestic firms while firms owned 
by foreign capital increase their labor demand.  In Brazil, the relatively higher 
flexibility of the labor market could have compensated for any distortions 
created by foreign capital inflows [complete with article} 
 
c) Ideology by itself cannot explain policy preferences and policy-making. FDI 
liberalization has been adopted, and continued, by leftist and conservative 
political parties. 
 
d) The role played by external forces in imposing FDI liberalization cannot be 
isolated from the influence of domestic economic variables such as current 
account deficits and the general macroeconomic environment. Facing high levels 
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of external debt, Argentina drastically liberalized its FDI regime at the 
beginning of the 1990s but upset foreign investors with changes to the 
regulatory environment since 2002.  
 
e) In both countries the liberalization of the FDI regime was inserted in a general 
framework of market-oriented structural reforms. In this sense, it is complicated 
to discern the effects of FDI on domestic factors of production. For example, 
trade liberalization had already weakened the bargaining position of domestic 
capital and labor in the tradable sector.  FDI affected fundamentally the non-
tradable sector of the economy. Moreover, at the end of the 1990s and beginning 
of the 2000s both countries experienced devaluation and financial crisis (in the 
case of Argentina) that altered the income of the factors of production. 
 
f) Brazil adopted a more gradual, and perhaps stable, approach to FDI 
liberalization than Argentina.  Such difference responds to a variety of factors: 
higher opposition to market-oriented reforms, less disappointing economic 
growth results, slower political decision and execution making process, and 
lower dependence on multilateral institutions. 
 
While the results provided in this paper seem to suggest that the liberalization of FDI 
took place in both countries as a political design isolated from the pressures of labor and 
capital, it is key to highlight that, at least, in Argentina the implementation of 
“compensation” mechanisms probably appeased the rejection of unskilled workers, 
specific-asset firms and business groups hurt by the reforms. 
 
The need for a dynamic approach that takes into account the distributional consequences 
of FDI and their political economy consequences has been highlighted throughout the 
article. Further research should also include the role played by MNCs already operating 
in the country. Caves (1996) sustains that given that MNCs lack election-voting rights, 
the government will tend to favor domestic firms vis-à-vis foreign firms. However, in 
the specific case of emerging economies suffering from “original sin”, the MNC can 
become a powerful political player.  The “traditional” Vernon’s obsolescing bargaining 
has been recently enhanced with interesting political economy contributions. See 
Desbordes and Vauday (2007).  
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